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INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan stood in the Old
Executive Office Building in front of members of Congress and
America to offer an apology.1 Reagan was signing the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988,2 which acknowledged the harm that was done
to Japanese Americans through their internment during World War
II and granted reparations for the injustice inflicted. Perhaps more
importantly, it also issued an official apology from the United
States government.3 Reagan proclaimed that the most important
part of the bill was not the $20,000 that would be available to
Japanese Americans who had been detained, but rather “honor.”4
“For here we admit a wrong; here we reaffirm our commitment as
a nation to equal justice under the law.”5 Reagan realized the harm
inflicted on Japanese Americans was more than just economic.
Reagan did not define what he meant by “honor,” and he was
unclear as to whom the honor was directed, but it appears that his
underlying belief was that an official government apology had the
power to input something necessary to restoration that could not
come in the form of economic payment. Reagan did not articulate
whether the apology would bestow honor upon Japanese
Americans through the recognition that the United States had
violated their human dignity by implementing racist ideas that
negatively impacted an entire race of people. Nor did he articulate
whether the apology would restore honor upon the United States
through the recognition that the United States committed a severe
wrong, or whether it was now taking responsibility for the harm it
caused and was attempting to correct it. Perhaps the apology was
working towards both of those ends.
Slavery and its legacy—the racist ideas and racist policies that
were used to uphold the systematic institution of bondage and
oppression—have inflicted greater harm upon African Americans
1. President Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, Remarks on
Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for the Wartime Internment of Japanese-American
Civilians (Aug. 10, 1988), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/081088d.
2. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
100th-congress/house-bill/442.
3. Id.
4. Reagan, supra note 1.
5. Id.
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in the United States than World War II internment did upon
Japanese Americans.6 The harm caused by slavery has a much
longer history, deeply interwoven in the founding of the United
States, and even predating it, creating the defining context of race
by which other racial oppressions are then overlaid.7 This legacy
has certainly inflicted a variety of economic harms that persist to
the present day.8 But the legacy of slavery has also inflicted
non-economic harms in the form of racist ideas and perspectives
that continue to permeate American memory.9 The Supreme Court
6. This is not to minimize the harmful effect of Japanese American internment. The
harm inflicted on Japanese Americans was severe and reprehensible. “[A]fter the bombing
of Pearl Harbor, 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry living in the United States were
forcibly removed from their homes and placed in makeshift internment camps. This action
was taken without trial, without jury. It was based solely on race . . . .” Reagan, supra note 1.
See also ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000).
7. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD (2006) [hereinafter INHUMAN BONDAGE] (recounting the history
of slavery in a global context); NICHOLAS GUYATT, BIND US APART: HOW ENLIGHTENED
AMERICANS INVENTED RACIAL SEGREGATION (2016) (discussing the ideological roots of
“separate but equal” and how both black and Native Americans were implicated); JOHN
WOOD SWEET, BODIES POLITIC: NEGOTIATING RACE IN THE AMERICAN NORTH, 1730–1830
(2003) (exploring the relationship between culture, racial identity, and postcolonial politics);
STEPHANIE E. SMALLWOOD, SALTWATER SLAVERY: A MIDDLE PASSAGE FROM AFRICA TO
AMERICAN DIASPORA (2007) (a transatlantic view, explaining the commoditization of African
people and the cultural justifications for the process).
8. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE
RACIAL WEALTH GAP 10 (2017) (“The stark wealth distortion caused by slavery and the
longevity of its effects cannot be overestimated.”). See generally DAINA RAMEY BERRY, THE
PRICE FOR THEIR POUND OF FLESH: THE VALUE OF THE ENSLAVED, FROM WOMB TO GRAVE, IN
THE BUILDING OF A NATION (2017) (exploring the economic value of enslaved people through
each phase of life); ANA LUCIA ARAUJO, REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE: A
TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE HISTORY (2017) (a narrative history of claims for
reparations for slavery); SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Sven Beckert & Seth Rockman eds., 2016) (arguing that slavery was central
to the development and growth of American capitalism between the Revolution and the
Civil War).
9. See generally IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE
HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016) (a narrative account exploring the development
of racist thought from the colonial era to the present day); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (tracing the
evolution of racism from explicit in the Jim Crow era to covert in the era of mass
incarceration); TA-NEHISI COATES, WE WERE EIGHT YEARS IN POWER: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY
(2017) (a collection of essays exploring the lingering effects of American slavery even after
the election of America’s first black president).
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has been implicit in creating and perpetuating those racist ideas
that led to a false historical memory. The Court has written racist
opinions that have colored the historical narrative of African
Americans in a way that encouraged racist beliefs to continue and
fed the appetite of white supremacy.10 Dred Scott v. Sandford is the
most obvious and far-reaching example.11
The Supreme Court should have a mechanism through which
it can issue an official apology for damaging opinions and the Court
should start with the Dred Scott case. Most erroneous opinions have
the opportunity to be corrected through a subsequent opinion, so
an official apology is not necessary for those cases. But the
opportunity to admit a wrong and make corrections rarely comes
when an opinion is overruled through a constitutional amendment.
An amendment acts as a new starting point for the Court,
minimizing the previous erroneous opinion and whatever effect on
individuals that it might have had. An apology would provide one
avenue towards a greater reckoning of the Court’s effect on the role
of African Americans in U.S. society. As Alfred Brophy suggests,
an apology would “honor the memory of those who were
enslaved[,]” show an “understand[ing] that the sins of our
country’s past burden us still today[,]” and “would help correct the
ignorance of many Americans about our past.”12
This Note addresses some of the framework under which an
apology would fit and why the Court should start with the Dred
Scott case. Part I addresses why the Court’s communication about
Dred Scott thus far has not appropriately addressed the errors the
opinion contains. Part II explains how an apology is an
appropriate remedy under a corrective justice framework—this
includes analyzing Dred Scott through the lens of historical
injustice and how this is understood within a broader historical
context. Part III places an apology for Dred Scott within an

10. See infra Part I.
11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12. Alfred L. Brophy, Considering Reparations for Dred Scott, in THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 177, 186 (David Thomas
Konig, Paul Finkelman & Christopher Alan Bracey eds., 2010) [hereinafter Brophy,
Considering Reparations].
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anti‑racist theoretical framework. And Part IV explains how the
Court can set limits on when it would issue an apology.
I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
ERRORS OF DRED SCOTT
In 1857, the Supreme Court of the United States issued the
infamous Dred Scott decision, in which the Court invalidated the
Missouri Compromise and found that Scott was a slave and,
therefore, not a citizen.13 More broadly, Dred Scott is understood as
holding that “the Constitution did not recognize [any] black
Americans as citizens of the United States or their own State.”14 Dred
Scott was superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. While
it is clear the Court rejects the “deplorable” holding of Dred Scott,15
the Court has not clearly communicated, nor corrected, what was
wrong with the Dred Scott opinion. This is not to say that the Court
has made no efforts to confront the problems with Dred Scott, nor to
say that the Court has done nothing to grapple with its history of
racism. For example, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
Justice Marshall addressed the Court’s role in propagating the idea
that slaves were property through Dred Scott.16 Furthermore, Justice
Marshall summarized the Court’s history of upholding racial
oppression and discrimination against black Americans, and the
legacy thereof.17 He asserted that “it must be remembered that,
during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by
th[e] Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms
of discrimination against the Negro.”18 Justice Marshall seemed to
know that a romanticized version of history does more damage than
good. In order to uphold the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of all
Americans and to repair remanences of distrust, the Court should
come to a full reckoning with Dred Scott.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 453–54.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2352 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 389–90 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 387–96.
Id. at 387.
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Dred Scott continues to hang like a specter over the Court’s
jurisprudence because the Court has not specifically addressed its
racist errors. The case has been brought up in recent opinions under
a negative light, but the general focus is on Constitutional
principles rather than the racist ideology or racial impact. Dred Scott
appeared as recently as April 2020, where Justice Thomas
mentioned it in his concurrence.19 According to Thomas, Dred Scott
was an “incorrect decision[]” based on the theory of due process
incorporation, yet he went no further in his reasoning that it was
incorrect.20 We are left to assume that his negative view of Dred
Scott has more to do with the theory of due process incorporation
than anything else. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court noted
Dred Scott during its discussion of the history of the Court’s
authority for constitutional review of statutes.21 The Court
explained how the reasoning of Dred Scott fits into the historical
context but never addressed the wrongs of the opinion directly. The
Court only noted that “[t]he ensuing judgment of history needs no
recounting here.”22 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gamble v. United
States noted the dangers of strict adherence to the use of stare
decisis when evaluating constitutional interpretation.23 As an
example, Gorsuch points to Dred Scott, along with Plessy and
Korematsu, asserting that Dred Scott was a “grotesque error.”24 He
noted that “violence” was done “to the Constitution in the name of
protecting slavery and slaveowners” by holding that “the Due
Process Clause prevented Congress from prohibiting slavery in the
territories, though” it “did nothing of the sort.”25 However, he did
not explain how the Court erroneously came to this conclusion,
what the correct analysis should have been, nor did he
acknowledge what damage was inflicted on black Americans
through the Court’s error.
Earlier in the Court’s history in relation to the Dred Scott
opinion, it is unclear whether the Court thought there was anything
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1424 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755–65 (1997).
Id. at 759.
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2005–06 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2006.
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wrong with the opinion that had to do with race or racism. In 1901,
Justice Brown noted in Downes v. Bidwell that “[t]he difficulty with
the Dred Scott case was that the court refused to make a distinction
between property in general, and a wholly exceptional class of
property.”26 Notice that Justice Brown’s assertion implicitly
accepted the racist notion of African Americans as property. Not to
mention that Dred Scott did more than just refuse to make a
distinction. There, the Court affirmatively and specifically
classified the ownership of black humans as “like an ordinary
article of merchandise and property . . . .”27 The Downes opinion
spent a relatively considerable amount of space discussing Dred
Scott and even noted its use as authoritative.28 Yet, the Court said
nothing to critique the notion of humans as property itself, only that
it was not recognized as being under a different type of ownership.
The 1898 United States v. Wong Kim Ark case would have been a
prime opportunity for the Court to say something about the racist
beliefs that buttressed the Dred Scott opinion. Instead, the Court
simply noted that the Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott,
“establish[ing] the citizenship of free negroes, which had been
denied in the opinion . . . .”29 The Court’s choice to not directly and
specifically address the underlying racist ideologies in the Dred
Scott opinion served to surreptitiously perpetuate the apparent
legitimacy of those ideologies.
Occasionally, the Court has made gestures towards the racist
errors of Dred Scott by pointing out its racist thinking. In a 2007
concurrence, Justice Thomas noted:
Indeed, if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us
to beware of elites bearing racial theories . . . . Can we really be
sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy

26. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 275 (1901).
27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857) (enslaved party),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
28. Downes, 182 U.S. at 271–76. “It must be admitted that this case is a strong authority
in favor of the plaintiff[.]” Id. at 273.
29. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898).
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are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but
beneficent and progressive? 30

In Justice Powell’s 1980 concurrence of Fullilove v. Klutznick, he
noted the Court’s role in perpetuating racist belief through its
opinions.31 He admitted “our own decisions played no small part
in the tragic legacy of government-sanctioned discrimination.”32
Even earlier, Justice Harlan, in his 1896 dissent of Plessy, had called
attention towards the influence that racism has over court opinions
by using Dred Scott as an example.33 He apparently recognized the
role that racism plays in creating a schism of distrust between black
Americans and institutions of power such as the Court. He notes:
The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly
arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a
feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments,
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so
inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens?34

Ironically, while talking about people of Chinese descent just a
short while later, he asserted that “[t]here is a race so different from
our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States.”35 Thus, in one big judicial breath,
Justice Harlan both acknowledged a problem inherent in racism
while also upholding racist ideology. Yet, none of these examples
went so far as to unravel what, exactly, was wrong in the Dred Scott
decision, nor do they go so far as to specifically make corrections.
In some instances, the Court has gone so far as to memorialize
the words of Justice Taney in the Dred Scott opinion. In 1905, Justice
30. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780–82
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406–07 (“[T]hey [members of
the ‘negro African race’] had no rights which the white man was bound to respect[.]”)).
31. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id.
33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559–60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. Id. at 560.
35. Id. at 561.
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Brewer quoted Taney while asserting the “changeless nature and
meaning” of the Constitution.36 Justice Brewer did the same in
recounting the birth of the United States through the creation of the
Constitution.37 Perhaps rather than fantasizing about the purity of
the Constitution and the Court’s relationship with it, the Court
should contend with the way it has used the Constitution as a tool
to perpetuate racist ideas. The Court is undeniably intertwined
with the unequal treatment that has been afforded to African
Americans and the words of the Court have had very real
consequences for an entire race of people. The Court should
directly confront this reality and redress its errors.
II. UNDER A CORRECTIVE JUSTICE FRAMEWORK, AN APOLOGY IS AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR HARM INFLICTED BY THE
DRED SCOTT OPINION
Principles of corrective justice justify the ability for the Court to
be able to issue an apology and rectify past mistakes when the
opportunity to do so in an opinion cannot arise. Corrective justice
is a theoretical framework that is usually applied to tort or contract
law.38 It is a concept rooted in relationship because it is “the idea
that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on
another.”39 Central to corrective justice is a notion of equality that
36. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905) (quoting Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) (“It is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the
same rights and privileges to the citizens; and as long as it continues to exist in its present
form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which
it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the
people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial
character of the court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.”).
37. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 441) (“The
new government was not a mere change in a dynasty, or in a form of government, leaving
the nation or sovereignty the same, and clothed with all the rights, and bound by all the
obligations of the preceding one. But, when the present United States came into existence
under the new government, it was a new political body, a new nation, then for the first time
taking its place in the family of nations.”).
38. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002).
39. Id. at 349; see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing
Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127, 148–70 (2008).
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exists between two parties that is not based on any sort of wealth
disparity.40 Rather, equality “refer[s] to the entitlement of each of
the interacting parties to have what is rightfully theirs.”41
Therefore, corrective justice seeks to restore the baseline equality to
the parties.42
The goal of corrective justice is to rectify the wrong through a
resolution that recognizes the interconnectedness between two
parties. This differs from the concept of distributive justice because
the distributive justice framework imposes a general societal duty
based on a variety of categories including merit or need, not just
equality.43 Corrective justice provides a narrower framework that
addresses the specific interaction and connection between two
parties. “[T]he plaintiff is asserting that the two are connected as
doer and sufferer of the same injustice.”44 The sufferer has only
suffered because the doer has done something to disrupt the
equality between the two parties—each playing a different role of
the same injustice.45 Thus, the remedy “responds [directly] to the
injustice and [must be] correlatively structured.”46 Corrective
justice requires that the remedy address the interrelationship of the
parties—actual benefits received or the failure to fulfill a duty on
the part of the defendant, and the deficiencies or detriments
suffered by the plaintiff.47
Nonetheless, the injustice must be based on an established right
and a duty to not violate or encroach upon that right. Whatever the
rights and duties may be, they “are actualized through a set of judicial
institutions that endows them with a determinate shape, makes public
the mode of reasoning that accords with what is presupposed in them,
and undoes the consequences of conduct inconsistent with them.”48
However, the justifications for redress offered by corrective justice are

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

326

Weinrib, supra note 38, at 349, 354; Wyman, supra note 39, at 149.
Weinrib, supra note 38, at 354.
Id. at 349.
Wyman, supra note 39, at 149.
Weinrib, supra note 38, at 349 (emphasis added).
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 354.
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contingent and are limited to some extent.49 Katrina Wyman, a
professor at New York University School of Law who researches the
redress of historical injustices, identifies at least three conditions that
must exist in order for corrective justice theories to apply: “the
existence requirement, the violation-of-protected-interest requirement,
and the remediable violation requirement.”50
A. Corrective Justice Theory Requirements
1. Existence requirement
All three conditions of the corrective justice theory are met
when considered in the context of an apology for Dred Scott. First,
theories of corrective justice have an existence requirement. This
requirement demands that “a duty of repair applies only if the
wrongdoer and the victim still exist.”51 The existence requirement
makes sense within the framework of corrective justice because of
its focus on interrelationship. It is agent-specific.52 If one of the
parties no longer exists, it would be impossible to restore the
equality between them.53 However, contemplating the existence
requirement when the parties are institutions or collective agents
becomes less concrete, and even more so when the remedy seeks to
address a historical injustice.54
It is probably easier to accept the notion that the wrongdoer
continues to exist over time, even when that wrongdoer is a
collective agent or institution, than it is to accept the notion that the
victim still exists. We implicitly understand continual existence
when it comes to corporations or government entities,55 including
the Supreme Court. “[T]he law presumes that governments and
corporations retain their identities over time, even when the
individuals comprising them change.”56 This is also how we view
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Wyman, supra note 39, at 148–49.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 150–51.
See id.
Id. at 151.
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each court within our judicial system. Generally, there would have
to be a fundamental change in the collective agent, or in the
relationship between the collective agent and the action central to the
injustice, to break continued existence.57 There has been no
fundamental change in the Supreme Court as an institution to justify
removing liability from the Dred Scott opinion. The ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment also is not sufficient to remove liability
because it does not fundamentally change the relationship between
the Court and the Dred Scott opinion. The work of the Fourteenth
Amendment was exerted by the will of the people through the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, not the Judiciary.
The Fourteenth Amendment also does not correct all of the harms
inflicted upon African Americans by the opinion. The Amendment
actualized African Americans’ claim to citizenship, but it did not
correct the harm the Court inflicted by the erasure of history.58
Therefore, the Court’s liability remains.
Determining whether a victim continues to exist is more
difficult when the victim is a collective group of people that have
individually changed over time—in this case, African Americans.
Of course, direct victims of a violation retain their entitlement to
redress, but that does not necessarily mean that their descendants
do.59 Wyman asserts two ways to determine whether descendants
can continue to claim entitlements of redress over time.60 First,
“define deceased direct victims as still existing because they have
continuing interests after they die.”61 Continuing interests could
include, for example, “the well-being of the remaining family
members” or “knowing that their children and grandchildren
had collected [restitution] that they had not been able to collect[.]”62
Second, Wyman suggests “extend[ing] the concept of victim
to define descendants of direct victims as victims of the injustice”

57. See id.
58. David Thomas Konig, Constitutional Law and the Legitimation of History: The
Enduring Force of Roger Taney’s “opinion of the court”, in THE DRED SCOTT CASE: HISTORICAL
AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW 9, 10 (David Thomas Konig, Paul
Finkelman & Christopher Alan Bracey eds., 2010) [hereinafter Konig, Legitimation].
59. See Wyman, supra note 39, at 153.
60. Id. at 154–56.
61. Id. at 154.
62. Id.

328

329

Admitting a Wrong

because of the continued effect on the direct victim’s immediate
descendants.63 For example, the direct victim’s suffering left
them “less able to support their descendants materially and
emotionally,” or the descendants were “deprived . . . of their
inheritance rights.”64
The existence requirement does not demand that either the
original wrongdoer or original victim remain in connection through
the specific injustice. Nonetheless, Wyman argues that the existence
requirement necessarily imposes a time limit.65 In her estimation,
descendants would only be entitled to redress for the historical
injustice for one or two generations.66 However, Wyman’s argument
assumes an economic remedy. When the only method of redress is
money damages, too many factors can come into play that mitigate
the continued legacy of the damage the injustice caused. When the
harm is not economic, the legacy of that harm can last over many
generations. The impact of the harm inflicted by the Dred Scott
opinion may have changed over time, but the harm itself has
remained to the present day because it has never been corrected.
2. Violation-of-protected-interest requirement
The second requirement under the corrective justice framework
is that “the wrongdoer must have violated a protected interest of
the victim.”67 Because the wrongdoer and the victim must be
connected through the same injustice, “if the claimant cannot point
to an interest of his that has been violated by the alleged
wrongdoer,” the “claimant is not entitled to corrective justice.”68 In
other words, “[a] victim cannot transfer his entitlement to repair to
someone who was not harmed by the wrongdoer.”69 In addition,
the law at the time the injustice took place is irrelevant.70 This is
because corrective justice is concerned about inherent equality
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 155.
Id. at 155–56.
Id.
Id. at 154–56.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
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rooted in moral understandings.71 If the law allows for an injustice
to take place, then “that law would be merely another example of
the injustice.”72
While there is no exhaustive list of interests that are subject
to a violation, “bodily integrity and core property rights” are the
protected interests that most often “trigger a duty of repair.”73
This is likely why Wyman assumed an economic remedy is
appropriate under a corrective justice framework, thereby
instituting a time limit. Economic damages easily correlate with
the relationship between the wrongdoer and victim when the
injustice involves physical damage to property or person.
However, violations of human dignity are also a violation of a
protected interest.
The Court began talking about the importance of human
dignity in the 1940s. In Justice Murphy’s 1946 dissent from
Application of Yamashita, he argued that recognizing human
dignity was of the “utmost importance” in developing an
“orderly international community.”74 A Westlaw search shows
that the Court has mentioned human dignity in at least
seventy-two opinions. In 2015 Justice Thomas, in his dissent
from Obergefell v. Hodges, claimed that the idea of human dignity
was imbedded in our nation’s founding through the Declaration
of Independence. 75 Justice Thomas embraced an idealistic
version of the founding where human dignity was “innate” and
could not be taken away, even through the system of slavery. 76
In Justice Thomas’s view, “[t]he government cannot bestow
dignity, and it cannot take it away.”77 While there may be some
philosophical truth to Justice Thomas’s assertion, it fails to
reckon with the realities of slavery and our founding’s failure
to fully acknowledge the humanity of black people. Human
dignity is more than a philosophical idea. The Court is a central
institution to our government and its failure to confront its own
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Id. at 158.
Id. at 156–57.
Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 721 (2015).
Id. at 735.
Id.
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role in degrading black Americans inflicts real harm. The Court
violated the human dignity of black Americans through Dred
Scott by creating a false historical narrative.
3. Remediable violation requirement
The third condition required under a corrective justice
framework is “that it must be possible for the violation of the victim’s
protected interest to be remedied.”78 If the goal of corrective justice
is to provide a remedy that restores equality, when there can be no
remedy, there can be no restoration of equality.79 Thinking of
remedies only in economic terms creates doubts about the ability to
provide a remedy for non-economic injustices.
The Supreme Court is the most powerful and influential judicial
institution that exists in the United States because all lower courts
must fall in line with their decisions. Only Congress has the power
to stray from a Court opinion, and even then, legislation is not
always successful under judicial review. The ideals of our judicial
system and institutions are founded on notions of fairness and
coherence,80 yet the Court has sometimes fallen short of these
ideals. “[C]orrective justice provides the immanent critical
standpoint informing the law’s effort to work itself pure.”81
Echoing the principle President Reagan articulated in 1988, by
admitting a wrong, the Court can reaffirm its commitment to equal
justice under the law by issuing an official apology for Dred Scott.
An apology for Dred Scott is an appropriate remedy because the
Court violated the human dignity of black Americans through its
words. The Court inflicted harm on black Americans by creating a
false historical narrative. Under a corrective justice lens, that harm
could be remedied by issuing another opinion—taking the form of
an apology—that specifically addresses the erroneous history
presented in Dred Scott.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Wyman, supra note 39, at 158.
See id.
See Weinrib, supra note 38, at 356.
Id.
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B. The Harm the Court Inflicted on Black Americans Is a Historical Injustice
The opinion of Dred Scott created a false version of history that
erased the success of the black struggle to attain recognition of
human dignity and erased the ways in which black Americans
asserted their citizenship.82 The false and distorted version of
history presented by the Court in Dred Scott is echoed in modern
racist ideas that contend that African Americans have some level
of culpability in slavery and the ongoing oppression of black
bodies in the United States. 83 It has not been enough that Dred
Scott was overturned through the Fourteenth Amendment to
overcome this type of belief. Nor is it enough that the Court has
distanced itself from the opinion. The Court should take
anti-racist measures to correct its past mistakes by creating a
mechanism through which it can make an official apology and
correct the history it got so terribly wrong.
Recent years have seen an increase in discussion of economic
reparations as a remedy for the injustices of slavery and the legacy
of Jim Crow. These plans would most heavily involve actions by
the legislative and the executive branches. The Supreme Court may
end up having a role in supporting reparations through subsequent
litigation, yet upholding the constitutionality of reparations would
most likely not directly address historical harms that have been
specifically inflicted by the Court itself. The harms against African
Americans have not only been economic. Through opinions like
that of Dred Scott, the Court contributed to negative stigmas that
have affected black Americans since the day of the decision.
Particular to Dred Scott, the Court created a false history of what
African Americans were experiencing at the time of the decision
and how the laws of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were
acknowledging black rights and citizenship. At the same time the
Court created a false historical memory, it also erased the success
of African Americans in asserting their citizenship. The Court has a
duty to correct its erasure of this history.
82. See infra Section II.C.
83. See Blair L.M. Kelley, If Enslaved Americans Weren’t Mentally Strong, There Wouldn’t
Even Be a Kanye West, WASH. POST (May 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/posteverything/wp/2018/05/03/if-enslaved-americans-werent-mentally-strong-therewouldnt-even-be-a-kanye-west/.
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The Court inflicted a historical injustice against black
Americans through the false history created in Dred Scott.
According to Katrina Wyman, historical injustices generally share
four characteristics: (a) they were committed or sanctioned at least
a generation ago; (b) they were committed or authorized by one
or more collective agents, such as a government or corporation;
(c) they harmed many individuals; and (d) they involved
violations of fundamental human rights, often discrimination
based on race, religion, or ethnicity.84

The Court should not be immune from redressing its historical
wrongs. “[C]laims for redressing [historical injustices] typically
have involved collective action directed at the legislative and
executive branches of government and/or private corporations.”85
Sometimes, claims for redress are made through litigation, but
defendants in those cases are rarely found liable.86 Thus, victims of
injustice are only left with political action to receive the redress they
seek. However, in the case of Dred Scott, the Supreme Court—the
judicial branch—acted as the collective agent, and currently there
is no mechanism other than a holding or opinion whereby the
Court can correct a past error.
Principles of corrective justice demand that the judicial branch
has a way to remedy harms that it commits. Usually, this comes in
the form of an opinion where the Court can overrule past erroneous
holdings, correct past faulty reasoning, and identify racist or
problematic language. However, as with Dred Scott, when there is
no opportunity to correct a past opinion through a new opinion, an
official apology of the Court serves as a corrective remedy.
Apologizing for and correcting the mistakes in Dred Scott is not
only just but is also moral. The principle of corrective justice is
rooted in moral grounds which “usually . . . assume[] to generate
an obligation on specific individuals to repair losses that they
caused to other[s].”87 This is what President Reagan was referring
to when he talked about “honor.” He implicitly recognized that
84.
85.
86.
87.

Wyman, supra note 39, at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
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there was a moral duty to apologize for past mistakes, even when
those mistakes are made at an institutional level. The Court needs
to recognize its moral duty to redress the injuries of Dred Scott. The
harm created through the false historical narrative of Dred Scott has
endured by erasing the success of the African American struggle to
attain rights and assert their freedom and citizenship. Although the
black citizens affected at the time of the decision in 1857 are long
gone, remnants of the historical erasure remain.
C. Justice Taney’s Opinion Was a False Representation of History
The clear sin of Taney’s Dred Scott opinion was that it inflicted
harm on African Americans through the creation of a false historical
narrative. There is scholarly debate over different aspects of the
opinion such as whether Taney got the constitutional interpretation or
legal reasoning wrong.88 Various scholars have expounded on the
errors of Taney’s opinion, including: “It decided issues that were not
necessary to the decision of the case, . . . [i]t supposed that there might
be a ‘constitutional’ settlement of largely political issues[,] [a]nd it
substituted a Southern interpretation of the Constitution . . . in place
of what people had understood as constitutional up to that point.”89
There is debate over whether the reasoning regarding constitutional
doctrine was sound;90 however, the historical narrative was
certainly wrong.
The false historical narrative created in Justice Taney’s opinion
inflicted a specific type of harm on African Americans. According to
David Thomas Konig, “the impact of rejecting a particular legal
doctrine differs materially from that of rejecting a particular version of
history, which ultimately poses a much greater harm in a
democracy.”91 The effects of false history reach beyond the legal
decision.92 A bad legal decision “may affect only the parties to a
particular case” or in the case of broader impact, such as the effect of
88. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Myth-Making: Lessons from the Dred Scott Case,
37 OCCASIONAL PAPERS L. SCH. UNIV. CHI. 1 (1996); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV.
379 (2011).
89. Brophy, Considering Reparations, supra note 12, at 180.
90. See id. at 181; GRABER, supra note 88.
91. Konig, Legitimation, supra note 58, at 10.
92. Id.
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Dred Scott, the “impact can be reversed by constitutional
amendment.”93 The Fourteenth Amendment, not a Supreme Court
case, overruled the decision in Dred Scott and declared African
Americans as full citizens of the United States.94 Yet, as Konig
contends, the opinion’s “greater and much longer term damage lies
outside the law and continues to the present day” by “corrupting our
nation’s historical memory and creating a false normative narrative of
the American experience.”95
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court gives the words of its
opinions power to influence social thinking and when its words are
wrong, steps should be taken to correct them. The Court distorted the
role African Americans have played in our history, and this distortion
can have a continuing effect when “fragments of doctrine” have the
possibility to remain.96 Justice Taney presented a racist version of
history meant to justify the degradation and subjugation of African
Americans. Taney asserted,
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for
his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made
by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and
position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their private
pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting
for a moment the correctness of this opinion.97

93. Id.
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. Konig, Legitimation, supra note 58, at 10.
96. Brophy, Considering Reparations, supra note 12, at 183.
97. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (enslaved party),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Taney likely knew that his statement was incorrect,98 but
nonetheless he presented it as reasoning to support the racist belief
that black Americans could not possibly be citizens.
Taney’s version of African American history in Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania was an erasure of black experience in those
states. It is an error to place historical conceptualizations of black
rights within a binary that places full citizenship on the one side
and total depravity on the other. Nonetheless, long before Dred
Scott, free and enslaved blacks were using the courts as a
mechanism to claim the same rights as white citizens in the
emerging republic, and white judges and political and religious
leaders were recognizing those rights.
1. The black struggle for citizenship in Massachusetts
Justice Taney noted that Massachusetts enacted an
anti‑miscegenation law in 1705 that remained in force at the time of
the Revolution in order to show “the fixed opinions concerning that
race.”99 Taney cherry picked laws that he thought supported his
belief that African Americans were fundamentally a degraded and
inferior race. He essentially argued that anti-miscegenation laws
proved that both the federal and state founders never intended to
include blacks in protections provided by the federal or state
constitutions.100 In reality, any degradation blacks experienced was
imposed upon them by racist ideologies and systems, not because
African Americans were biologically inferior. This notion is obvious
to our modern ideologies regarding race, but it was also obvious to
many people at the time of Justice Taney’s opinion. Black and white
Americans had been rejecting racist ideologies such as Taney’s and
had been using the legal system to assert black rights.
In 1780, while the Revolutionary War was still being fought,
Massachusetts abandoned its colonial charter and ratified a new state
constitution, written by John Adams, Samuel Adams, and James
Bowdoin.101 The language used in the constitution was a reflection of

98.
99.
100.
101.

Konig, Legitimation, supra note 58, at 12–13.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
Id.
CHRISTOPHER CAMERON, TO PLEAD OUR OWN CAUSE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND THE MAKING OF THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT 70 (2014).

336

337

Admitting a Wrong

revolutionary ideals, but it also provided an opportunity for
abolitionists. The first article states, “All men are born free and equal,
and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their
lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness.”102 For those agitating against the system of slavery, this
translated into a legal avenue towards freedom.103
Unlike some of the surrounding northern states that were
adopting gradual emancipation laws, the new Massachusetts state
legislature failed to create an explicit law regarding slavery, which
left it up to the courts to interpret the meaning of the 1780
constitution.104 Ironically, this ambiguity allowed both free and
enslaved African Americans in Massachusetts to continue
exploiting the legal system in order to test the boundaries of
revolutionary rhetoric, argue for their inclusion in the body politic
as full citizens of Massachusetts, and establish ownership of their
natural rights but also make broader and more explicit attacks on
slavery as an institution.
In North America during the American Revolution, slaves
themselves were driving the resistance to slavery, and the
ambiguity of Massachusetts law regarding slavery influenced the
forms of resistance that African Americans adopted. As
Christopher Leslie Brown contends, for the majority of the country,
those in power were mostly concerned with preserving slavery, or
at least protecting the interests of slave owners.105 Before
Massachusetts adopted the 1780 constitution, a 1778 draft
recognized slavery and explicitly denied black suffrage.106 Public
criticism over the morality of slavery included calls for
emancipation; however, the ratified version of the state constitution

102. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. I, amended by MASS. CONST., arts. of amend., art. CVI (This
is the original version. It was amended in the 1970s to change the word “men” to “people.”).
103. CAMERON, supra note 101.
104. Emily Blanck, Seventeen Eighty-Three: The Turning Point in the Law of Slavery and
Freedom in Massachusetts, 75 NEW ENG. Q. 24, 45–46 (2002).
105. Christopher Leslie Brown, The Problems of Slavery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 427, 428–29 (Edward G. Gray & Jane Kamensky eds., 2013).
106. MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 68 (2016).
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failed to address slavery directly. A change in consciousness may
have been growing, but not enough to provide meaningful
solutions to the problem of slavery. The greatest threat to the
institution was not the influence of Revolutionary language on
notions of freedom, but rather, enslaved people as they engaged in
various forms of resistance.107
One avenue of black resistance was in the form of legal
petitions.108 While their white neighbors used the legal system to
maintain their rights, African Americans had the burden of
establishing their right to freedom. These cases were filed by both
individuals and by groups, but either way they posed a threat to the
system of slavery.109 Early in the Revolutionary Era, individual
petitions had the power to set legal precedent, but also to
communicate meaningfully to the African American population at
large. Three petitions from Massachusetts during the Revolutionary
Era serve as examples of the ways in which black Americans were
asserting their citizenship while white Americans were recognizing
those rights: Belinda, Brom and Bett, and Quock Walker.
a. Belinda. In February of 1783, just months before the signing of
the Treaty of Paris that officially ended the American
Revolutionary War, a manumitted slave named Belinda filed a
petition with the Massachusetts General Court, the highest court in
the state, requesting to be paid an allowance out of the proceeds
from the confiscated estate of her loyalist former master, Isaac
Royall.110 Her case for restitution was based on the plunder of her
humanity—through the injustice and trauma of her kidnapping by
slave traders in Africa, the suppression of her natural rights
through enslavement, and the denial of access to the material

107. See Brown, supra note 105; SINHA, supra note 106, at 66, 68.
108. Harvard has digitized thousands of these petitions and makes them available here:
https://caps.gov.harvard.edu/digital-archive-anti-slavery-and-anti-segregation-petitions.
109. SHARON M. HARRIS, EXECUTING RACE: EARLY AMERICAN WOMEN’S NARRATIVES
OF RACE, SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 71 (2005).
110. Petition of Belinda an African, Massachusetts Anti-Slavery and Anti-Segregation
Petitions, SCI/series 45X, v.239-Revolution Resolves, 11–14 (1793) (Harvard University
Collection Development Department, Massachusetts Archives, Boston, Massachusetts),
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:50257769$4i [hereinafter Petition of Belinda].
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rewards of her own labor.111 Her argument culminates by
describing how, in her present old age and after faithful years of
work, despite gaining her freedom, she is left with nothing else.112
Powerfully, her petition relates how she “by the Laws of the Land,
is denied the enjoyment of one morsel of that immense wealth,
apart whereof hath been accumulated by her own industry, and the
whole augmented by her servitude.”113
Belinda employed rhetorical tactics in her petition that are
intended to keep the judges’ focus on her humanity and to prevent
turning their attention towards factors that could be used as
justification to minimize the injustices African Americans suffered
under slavery.114 By presenting herself as a human on equal footing
as her white neighbors, she could claim ownership of the same rights
and citizenship. Surprisingly, the legislature granted her a pension
of fifteen pounds and twelve schillings per year, to be paid out of the
proceeds of Isaac Royall’s estate, “for reasons set forth in said
Belinda’s petition.”115 This is significant because the legislature
recognized the trauma Belinda experienced through the mechanism
of the slave trade. In contradiction to Justice Taney’s version of
history in Dred Scott, the legislature implied that the notion of natural
rights applied to blacks as well as whites, and therefore, a slave had
the right to the product of his or her own labor, even while slavery
was still a legal system. The reward from the legislature affirmed
Belinda’s humanity and her claim to citizenship.
b. Brom and Bett. From 1781 to 1783 a series of concurrently
running cases, involving two different sets of people, were brought
before the Massachusetts courts. On May 28, 1781, former slaves
Brom and Bett, also known as “Mumbet” or Elizabeth Freeman, were

111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For example, her petition asserts that the land where she came from “would have
yielded her the most compleat [sic] felicity, had not her mind received early impressions of
the cruelty of men[.]” Id. It also uses phrases such as “her infant footsteps” and “with each
hand in that of a tender Parent.” Id.
115. Id.
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issued a pluries writ of replevin against John Ashley and his son.116
A writ of replevin is essentially a court order to return stolen property.117
“Pluries” meant that at least two previous writs had been issued and
the property had not been successfully returned.118 In this case, the
property in question was Brom and Bett themselves. They had
petitioned the court claiming that their bodies had been unlawfully
taken.119 Ashley refused their release, claiming that Brom and Bett
were his slaves.120
On August 21, 1781, the case came before the Massachusetts
Inferior Court of Common Pleas. Ashley asked for a dismissal,
claiming that Brom and Bett were his slaves at the time of the original
writ.121 Again, Brom and Bett asserted their freedom.122 On August
25, 1781, the jury, made up of white men, found “that the sd [sic]
Brom & Bett are not, nor were they at the time of ye purchase of the
original writ the legal Negro Servants of the sd [sic] John Ashley
during life” and Ashley was required to pay thirty shillings in
damages.123 The five judges of the court, also white men, agreed with
the jury’s ruling and added on “the Costs of this Suit, Taxed at five
pounds fourteen Shillings & four pence like Money.”124
c. Quock Walker. In the same year as the Brom and Bett cases, the
Inferior Court of Common Pleas also heard two civil cases regarding
former slave Quock Walker. Nine-month-old Walker was
purchased, along with his parents, by James Caldwell.125 After

116. Arthur Zilversmit, Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of Slavery in
Massachusetts, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 614, 620 (1968).
117. Replevin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
118. Pluries, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
119. Zilversmit, supra note 116.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 620–21.
123. Mumbet Case, Court Decision, August 1781, in AM I NOT A MAN AND A BROTHER:
THE ANTISLAVERY CRUSADE OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1688–1788, at 468, 469–470 (Roger
Bruns ed., 1977) [hereinafter Mumbet Case].
124. Id.; see also Zilversmit, supra note 116, at 621.
125. Robert M. Spector, The Quock Walker Cases (1781–83)—Slavery, Its Abolition, and
Negro Citizenship in Early Massachusetts, 53 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 12, 12 (1968); SINHA, supra note 106.
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Caldwell’s death, Walker was passed on to Mrs. Caldwell.126
Caldwell had promised to manumit Walker at the age of twenty-five
and Mrs. Caldwell had promised freedom at age twenty‑one.127
However, when Mrs. Caldwell married Nathaniel Jennison, Jennison
assumed Walker to be his property, desired to keep him enslaved,
and refused to manumit him.128 Walker fled from Jennison and
went to work for John and Seth Caldwell, brothers of his former
owner.129 Jennison forcibly seized Walker, severely beat him, and
locked him in a barn for several hours after bringing him back to the
Jennison home.130
The first case heard by the court was Jennison v. Caldwell, in
which Jennison was seeking damages for the use of his slave
without permission. Jennison produced a bill of sale as proof that
Walker was his slave and the court ruled that the Caldwells pay
damages to Jennison for expropriating Walker’s labor.131 However,
Walker had also sued Jennison for damages, claiming he was a free
man and not the legal slave of Jennison.132 Walker v. Jennison
followed Jennison v. Caldwell and incorporated arguments based on
moral grounds, bringing the practice of slavery into question, as
well as the promises of manumission.133 In this case, the court ruled
in favor of Walker, awarding damages and deciding that he was a
free man and not the slave of Jennison.134
Both of these cases were appealed, although Jennison defaulted
on his appeal, and it never went to court.135 On the other hand, the
Superior Court of Judicature heard the Caldwell appeal in
126. Spector, supra note 125; SINHA, supra note 106; CAMERON, supra note 101, at 76.
127. Spector, supra note 125; SINHA, supra note 106; CAMERON, supra note 101, at 76.
128. Spector, supra note 125; SINHA, supra note 106.
129. Spector, supra note 125; SINHA, supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note 116, at 614.
130. Spector, supra note 125; SINHA, supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note 116, at 614.
131. Spector, supra note 125, at 12–13; S INHA , supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note
116, at 614.
132. Spector, supra note 125, at 13; S INHA , supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note 116,
at 614.
133. Spector, supra note 125, at 13–14; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; Zilversmit, supra
note 116, at 614–15.
134. Spector, supra note 125, at 13–14; SINHA, supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note 116,
at 614.
135. CAMERON, supra note 101, at 76.
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September of 1781.136 Rather than rehashing the factual details of
the incident, the Caldwells’ attorney made broad claims regarding
the practice of slavery itself.137 He employed religious arguments
against slavery, stating that the practice was against the law of
God.138 He also appealed to the language of the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution, claiming it applied to African Americans as well as
white citizens.139 The court reversed the lower court’s decision in
Jennison v. Caldwell, affirming Quock Walker’s freedom and his
right to work for whomever he chose.140
During these civil cases in 1781, the details of the violence that
Jennison had inflicted on Walker led the court to indict Jennison
with criminal assault.141 However, the criminal case did not appear
before the Supreme Judicial Court until April of 1783,142 two
months after Belinda’s petition appeared before the Massachusetts
General Court. In Commonwealth v. Jennison, the prosecuting
attorney focused his arguments on the promises of manumission
that were made to Walker; therefore, Jennison had assaulted a free
man. Yet what makes this case of particular interest regarding the
status of slavery in Massachusetts are not the arguments of the
attorneys, but rather Chief Justice Cushing’s remarks to the jury.
Cushing explicitly addressed not only Walker’s individual status
regarding freedom but also slavery in general. Echoing the
sentiments of the Somerset decision,143 Cushing stated that although
136. Id. at 76–77.
137. Spector, supra note 125, at 14–15; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; Zilversmit, supra
note 116, at 615; CAMERON, supra note 101, at 77.
138. Spector, supra note 125, at 14–15; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; Zilversmit, supra
note 116, at 615.
139. Spector, supra note 125, at 14–15; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; Zilversmit, supra
note 116, at 615; CAMERON, supra note 101, at 77.
140. Spector, supra note 125, at 14–15; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; Zilversmit, supra
note 116, at 615.
141. Spector, supra note 125, at 13–14; SINHA, supra note 106; Zilversmit, supra note 116,
at 614.
142. CAMERON, supra note 101, at 77.
143. The Somerset decision in England in 1772 exemplifies, in an Atlantic context, the
broad influence individual petitions could have. James Somerset sued his master, Charles
Stuart, for freedom after being brought from Virginia to England. Somerset’s abolitionist
attorney argued that colonial slaves were made free if brought from the colonies to England.
Lord Chief Justice William Murray, Earl of Mansfield, ruled in favor of Somerset because
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slavery “has been heretofore countenanced by the Province Laws
formerly . . . nowhere is it expressly enacted or established.”144
He asserted that slavery was a practice adopted in the colonies from
the example set by European nations “for the benefit of trade and
wealth.”145 But now, he claimed, there is a growing consciousness
against slavery, stating, “[A] different idea has taken place with the
people of America, more favorable to the natural rights of mankind,
and to that natural, innate desire of Liberty.”146 He noted that this
is “without regard to color, complexion, or shape of noses.”147
In stark contrast to Justice Taney’s version of Massachusetts
history, Justice Cushing also affirmed the notion that slavery was
inconsistent with the new state constitution and that, at least in
Massachusetts, “there can be no such thing as perpetual servitude
of a rational creature.”148
Historians categorize the Brom and Bett and Quock Walker
cases as freedom petitions. Generally, freedom petitions are
understood to mean that an enslaved person appealed to the court
in order to become free. The slave’s status moved from unfree to
free at the moment of the court decision. Yet, in each of these cases,
the plaintiffs saw themselves as already being free at the time of the
incident in question, and the court decision affirmed this
perspective on their status. Viewing them as freedom suits takes on
the perspective of the white masters and assumes a natural state of
unfreedom. Black skin had developed meaning for both blacks and
whites regarding their rights. To white citizens, such as Ashley and
Jennison, black skin symbolized the right to own another human as
property. To African American citizens, black skin represented
there was no “positive law” that legitimized the system of slavery in England. The decision
applied narrowly to Somerset, but African Americans broadly interpreted it as abolishing
slavery in Britain. ALAN TAYLOR, THE INTERNAL ENEMY: SLAVERY AND WAR IN VIRGINIA,
1772–1832, at 19–23 (2013); INHUMAN BONDAGE, supra note 7, at 388 n.10.
144. Commonwealth v. Jennison, Chief Justice William Cushing to the Jury, 1783, in AM I
NOT A MAN AND A BROTHER: THE ANTISLAVERY CRUSADE OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA,
1688–1788, at 474, 474–75 (Roger Bruns ed., 1977).
145. Id. at 475.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; SINHA, supra note 106, at 68–69; see also Spector, supra note 125, at 16; Zilversmit,
supra note 116, at 615.
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their lack of the right to their own bodies, labor, identity, and
belonging. Through the use of these petitions, coupled with their
request for damages, Brom, Bett, and Walker were rejecting this
interpretation of blackness, claiming their right to their own bodies
and humanity, and inserting themselves into the body politic as
citizens of Massachusetts. From the perspective of the former slaves
involved in these petitions, they were owed damages because their
rights, of which they already had ownership, had been infringed
upon. They were agitating for what was already theirs.
2. The black struggle for citizenship in Pennsylvania
Black Americans in Pennsylvania experienced different
challenges than those in Massachusetts. As former British colonies
were developing their new systems of governance as emerging
states in the Revolutionary era, the state of Pennsylvania
became the model for northern states that chose to address the
problem of slavery through gradual emancipation. In 1780,
Pennsylvania passed the Gradual Abolition Act, which did not
grant immediate freedom to any slave.149 Rather, the Act declared
that any child born to a slave would be held as an indentured
servant until twenty-eight years old, at which time they would
become free.150 The law went into effect on March 1, 1780, and
all children born before that date were condemned to slavery for
life.151 This was a way to appease both abolitionists and white
masters in Pennsylvania. It provided a path towards the end of
slavery while also prolonging it. Indeed, complete abolition did not
come to fruition in Pennsylvania until 1847, just ten years before
Dred Scott.152
The possibility of a law explicitly addressing slavery in
Pennsylvania increased white anxieties over the vulnerability of the
institution of slavery, and therefore, the language used in the Act
149. See An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, in AM I NOT A MAN AND A BROTHER:
THE ANTISLAVERY CRUSADE OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1688–1788, at 445, 446–50 (Roger
Bruns ed., 1977) [hereinafter An Act].
150. Id.
151. Id. at 447.
152. See GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FORMATION OF PHILADELPHIA’S BLACK
COMMUNITY, 1720–1840, at 61–63 (1988); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770–1823, at 87–88 (1975) [hereinafter PROBLEM OF SLAVERY].
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sought to alleviate those fears.153 The tension between revolutionary
ideology and the benefits of racial hierarchy is expressed within the
Abolition Act itself. The first section of the Act draws on a common
trope of the white Revolutionary perspective that the “arms and
tyranny of Great Britain were exerted to reduce us” to the position of
slaves to the Empire.154 However, the Act is also forthcoming in
noting that Pennsylvania is willing only “to extend a portion of that
freedom to others, which hath been extended to us[.]”155 Yet the
framers of the Act also elide the complicity of whites in the creation
of racial difference by stating, “It is not for us to enquire why, in the
creation of mankind, the inhabitants of the several parts of the earth
were distinguished by a difference in feature or complexion.”156
In this way, white citizens of Pennsylvania could protect their moral
superiority while at the same time prolong slavery in the state and
keep African Americans from full and equal access to citizenship.
Gradual emancipation was also a way to quell white anxieties
over the loss of wealth and costs associated with manumission.
Allowing children to remain enslaved until they were twenty-eight
meant masters were able to recapture the costs associated with
raising them, effectively transferring the financial burden of
emancipation to slaves themselves rather than their white masters.157
Many slave-owning Pennsylvanians resisted compliance with the
new law in an attempt to protect their wealth vested in slavery. The
new law required masters to register all slaves by November 1, 1780,
otherwise they would be freed.158 Some ignored the registration,
claiming ignorance.159 Others sold their slaves south, or took children
and pregnant mothers into slave states to ensure they could remain in
bondage for life.160 Nonetheless, the future of slavery in Pennsylvania
153. See generally NASH, supra note 152 (explaining the circumstances that led up to the
Act and how they influenced the abolition of slavery in Pennsylvania).
154. An Act, supra note 149.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See NASH, supra note 152, at 61–63; BEVERLY C. TOMEK, COLONIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: EMANCIPATION, EMIGRATION, AND ANTISLAVERY IN ANTEBELLUM
PENNSYLVANIA 27 (2011); PROBLEM OF SLAVERY, supra note 152, at 86–92.
158. An Act, supra note 149.
159. NASH, supra note 152, at 63, 91–92, 108.
160. Id.
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was clear—it would end, and it would become much more difficult to
keep African Americans from accessing the same rights of citizenship
that white Americans enjoyed.
In Dred Scott, Justice Taney never mentioned that the passage of
the Act signaled to Pennsylvanians that black Americans had been
deprived of inherent rights. “The language of the law had
condemned slavery, admitting that it deprived African Americans
of ‘common blessings that they were by nature entitled to.’”161
While Pennsylvania did not abolish slavery and grant complete
rights of citizenship in an abrupt sweep, legislators did directly
address the subject and word of Pennsylvania’s efforts spread.162
In response to the resistance of slave owners, the Pennsylvania
Abolition Society (PAS) began litigating cases for black Americans
asserting their freedom.163 In the year 1784 alone, PAS litigated
twenty-two cases, including one against future president, George
Washington.164 Washington served as the defendant slaveholder’s
lawyer and essentially argued that “slaves were content to be living
in a perpetual bondage that was passed to all their children.”165 But
the trial court disagreed and Washington lost the case. In
Pennsylvania, as in Massachusetts, black Americans took
advantage of the legal system to assert their rights to citizenship.
However, Justice Taney erased this history in his opinion.
Rather than highlighting the successful black struggle for human
dignity in the emerging nation, Taney upheld his version of history
as a singular truth. While he admitted “[i]t is difficult at this day to
realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate
race,” Taney also asserted that “the public history of every
European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be
mistaken.”166 Justice Taney was wrong. The Court needs to take
measures to restore the history that the Dred Scott opinion stole.

161. GARY B. NASH, THE UNKNOWN AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE UNRULY BIRTH OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE AMERICA 326 (2005).
162. Id. at 326–27.
163. Id. at 412.
164. Id. at 412–13.
165. Id. at 413.
166. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (enslaved party),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Under a corrective justice framework, Justice Taney’s erasure
of public recognition of black rights and citizenship is a specific
harm that the Court should remedy. The harm remains because
the Court has never directly and specifically corrected the false
representation of history in Dred Scott. The false historical
narrative presented in Dred Scott is a continuing violation of the
inherent human dignity of black Americans. Furthermore, the
Court is able to remedy the violation by specifically addressing
and correcting the historical errors.
III. THE COURT NEEDS TO DIRECTLY CONFRONT THE HARM
CREATED AND PERPETUATED THROUGH THE RACIST POLICIES OF ITS
PAST BY DEVELOPING ANTI-RACIST POLICIES IN THE PRESENT
There is no doubt that the holding of Dred Scott, and the
reasoning behind it, was fueled by racist ideology. It is much more
difficult to determine exactly how the legacy of the Dred Scott
opinion remains an influence today. Nevertheless, the very nature
of the Court inherently subjects it to heightened responsibility for
the harm it inflicts. If the Court’s role was “merely adopting what
others had wrought, they would be a part of a larger system.
If, however, the Court went beyond that, and became an advance
advocate for pro[-racist] thought, then it has additional
culpability.”167 By not specifically addressing the errors of Dred
Scott, the Court has, perhaps inadvertently, put forth and
perpetuated racist ideas. Therefore, the Court has the responsibility
to create anti-racist policies that directly confront its racist past.
Having a mechanism by which to issue an apology would provide
a way for the Court to address its culpability, attempt to restore
equity, and “work itself pure” of racist ideology.
In order to understand what it would mean for the Court to
create an anti-racist policy, it is imperative to understand what
racism is. Ibram X. Kendi notes that in order to overcome the racial
inequalities that still exist in the United States, we must begin with
defining our terms.168 “If we don’t do the basic work of defining the
kind of people we want to be in language that is stable and
167. Brophy, Considering Reparations, supra note 12, at 180.
168. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 17 (2019).
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consistent, we can’t work toward stable, consistent goals.”169 Kendi
defines racism as “a marriage of racist policies and racist ideas that
produces and normalizes racial inequities.”170 This definition of
racism requires that there be some sort of force that is able to create
racist policies and ideas in the first place—what Kendi calls
“racist power.”171 The Supreme Court is an institution that holds this
kind of power. The Court engages in the creation of many policies,
not all of them racist of course, that are married to various ideas, even
if those ideas do not originate from the Court itself. The policies the
Court creates influence not only the law, but the way society thinks
about the law and the people affected by the law. Dred Scott
specifically and distinctly identified an entire group of people, no
matter where they were born or what their status regarding bondage
was, as “not citizens.” The Court specifically set aside black
individuals as “others”—not citizens, but not necessarily belonging
anywhere else. This racially driven degradation upheld racist ideas
from the past and also fed future racist ideas that furthered racial
inequity. The Dred Scott opinion at least normalized and perpetuated
racial inequities, even if the opinion did not create them.
The
term
“racist”
has
become
fraught
with
misunderstanding, which makes it difficult to understand what
it means to be “anti-racist.” The word racist has become
pejorative rather than descriptive, which in itself is the work of
racism.172 But it does not have to be a pejorative term. “[T]he only
way to undo racism is to consistently identify and describe it—
and then dismantle it.”173 Directly confronting the Court’s racist
past is the first step towards dismantling racism and the
inequities that still exist because of the racist policies that the
Court has historically upheld. The Court can use the mechanism
of an official apology to specifically identify and describe its past
errors. When it comes to the racist ideas and effects of Dred Scott,
an apology may even be more effective than an overruling
opinion would have been. An apology would allow the Court
more space and time to focus on the exact errors of Dred Scott.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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It would also place greater emphasis on the Court’s
acknowledgment of its own influence in the legacy of inequity
that black Americans continue to face. It would also signal to
both black Americans and the judicial system that the Court is
willing to examine and directly confront racism in the courts.
In order for the Court to become a force toward equity and to
build trust between the judicial system and black Americans, the
Court should directly confront its own history and use the word
“racist” as descriptive of its own conduct.
The idea that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is,
or should be, colorblind is a myth. Since the time of Justice Harlan’s
dissent from Plessy, the Court has often referred to the Constitution
as colorblind.174 Or, at least that a colorblind Constitution is an ideal
that our systems of governance should strive for.175 However, this
fails to take into account the reality that race has played since the
founding of our nation. The colorblind ideal fails to acknowledge
that our nation was founded on a system that rewarded and
incentivized slavery, leading to its expansion in the decades that
preceded the Civil War.176 And it ignores the struggle that black
Americans have had to continuously fight in order to obtain
equality. The Court’s striving for an “ideal” of colorblindness
inflicts another type of historical erasure. Ignoring the historical
role that race has played perpetuates racism by erasing the racial
context that remains as a vestige of racial hierarchy without ever
directly confronting or changing the systems that built that
hierarchy. Asserting colorblindness as an ideal is simply a way to
avoid directly confronting racism with anti-racism. “To be a racist
is to constantly redefine racist in a way that exonerates one’s
changing policies, ideas, and personhood.”177 By failing to see color

174. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 807 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing J. Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)); Schuette
v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 332 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 449, 513 (2005).
175. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905–06 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. See DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO
RATIFICATION (2009).
177. KENDI, supra note 168, at 17.
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in its interpretation of the Constitution, the Court fails to grapple
with the racial inequities it has effectuated through its holdings.
Anti-racism, on the other hand, works to reverse the work of
racism. It is the notion that if “[r]acism is a powerful collection of
racist policies that lead to racial inequity and are substantiated by
racist ideas,” then “[a]ntiracism is a powerful collection of antiracist
policies that lead to racial equity and are substantiated by
antiracist ideas.”178 Anti-racist policies are “written and unwritten
laws, rules, procedures, processes, regulations, and guidelines”
used to govern “that produce[] or sustain[] racial equity.”179
The notion that the Court should directly confront and correct its
Dred Scott opinion is an anti-racist idea. Having a mechanism by
which the Court publishes an official apology for Dred Scott is an
anti-racist policy. The reasoning and holding of Dred Scott were
used to govern and substantiate racial inequality. Issuing an
apology that corrects the errors of Dred Scott could be used to
govern and substantiate racial equity. The Court would need to
decide whether apologies would be binding or simply persuasive,
but nonetheless, an apology would signal the better ideal of
reaching racial equity.
IV. THE COURT CAN LIMIT HOW IT CHOOSES WHICH CASES
DEMAND AN APOLOGY
The Court would not have to issue an apology for every court
case that society or the Court deems was decided wrong. Dred Scott
is a good starting place because the Court never had an opportunity
to explicitly overrule and correct its mistake through a case.
Since Dred Scott was overruled through the Reconstruction
Amendments, subsequent cases that dealt with citizenship referred
to the Amendments rather than directly dealing with the errors in
Dred Scott. Dred Scott is one of the four cases that Jamal Greene
contends make up the “anticanon”—cases that were “so wrongly
decided that their errors . . . we would not willingly let die.”180 The
anticanon consists of Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu
because of near-universal agreement that the decisions in these cases
178. Id. at 20.
179. Id. at 18.
180. Greene, supra note 88, at 386–87.
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are exceptionally wrong.181 Alfred Brophy contends that the need for
apology may be the greatest for Dred Scott because “the opinion so
completely excluded African Americans from citizenship.”182
Although there is general agreement that the Dred Scott decision
was wrong, the Court has not made it clear why. In the last fifty
years, Dred Scott has “been cited negatively far more frequently than
positively,”183 but it is shocking that the case would be cited
positively at all. According to Greene, Dred Scott has been cited
positively multiple times since the 1970s, and a “strong pattern of
negative citation” did not begin until the 1960s.184 Even though
those positive citations may have been about issues other than
black citizenship, it leaves some confusion as to the Court’s position
on Dred Scott because the Court has never been clear as to the errors.
Issuing an apology would give the Court an avenue to explain in
detail what is wrong with Dred Scott, as well as whatever may be right.
Ideally, the Court would correct for past mistakes through an
opinion, but when no such opportunity can present itself, issuing
a formal apology is an appropriate remedy. Apologies play a
similar role in international law. While apologies are formally
recognized as a remedy, their “formal role is generally exceptional
and subordinate or auxiliary to the role of other remedies . . . .”185
The U.N. International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts were
adopted in 2001 and define the role of apology in international
law.186 The Articles do not define the substantive content of
international law, but rather “the general conditions” under
which a State becomes “responsible for wrongful actions or
omissions . . . .”187 Once a State has violated substantive law, the
181. Id. at 387, 390.
182. Brophy, Considering Reparations, supra note 12, at 186.
183. Greene, supra note 88, at 398.
184. Id.
185. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J.
INT’L L. 433, 449 (2006).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 449–50 (quoting Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, art. 37, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES
74 (James Crawford ed., 2002)).
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Articles call for that State to make reparation. 188 Reparation can
come in various forms, but in circumstances where reparation
cannot be made through restitution or compensation, the State is
required to give “satisfaction.”189 “Satisfaction may consist in an
acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal
apology or another appropriate modality.”190 An apology in the
international law context, provides a mechanism through which
the violating State takes responsibility for its actions and attempts
to remedy the diplomatic relationship when a financial remedy is
not assessable.191
Similar to an apology in the international law context, apologies
issued by the Supreme Court should be exceptional, subordinate,
or auxiliary to the appropriate remedy of correction through an
opinion. Exceptional circumstances arise when a holding is
overruled through an amendment, rather than through a majority
opinion of the Court. In an instance like this, such as in Dred Scott,
the Court has no opportunity to correct its errors in the previous
opinion, nor to address the harm that the previous opinion may
have caused. An official apology of the Court need not, and should
not, create any new substantive law because amendments,
legislation, and other Court opinions are better situated to do that
work. Nevertheless, addressing the injury caused by the Court’s
erroneous opinion does a sort of diplomatic work between the
Court and the American people. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to determine the extent of injury caused by opinions such as
Dred Scott, but it also is naïve to believe none were inflicted. Since
it would be impossible to assess a compensatory or punitive type
of remedy, an official apology from the Court is a reasonable and
appropriate form of restitution.

188. Id. at 450.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 451 (quoting Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, pt. 2, art. 37, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/589 (2001),
reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 74 (James Crawford ed., 2002)).
191. See id. at 452–53.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court cannot continue to pretend that it has no
liability for modern-day racial inequities. Principles of morality and
justice demand that the Court directly confront the racist policies it
supported and perpetuated that led to continued inequity for black
Americans. The Court denied black Americans of not only their
citizenship but also their humanity by erasing the true history of
black struggle and success. The theory of colorblindness has only
served as an obstacle toward full and honest justice. The only way
to overcome the ongoing effect of racism is for institutions like the
Court, which perpetuated white supremacist ideology, to honestly
grapple with the role they have played. This reckoning needs to
come through the creation of anti-racist policies.
Like President Reagan’s apology to Japanese Americans, the
Court’s apology could restore honor to the institution of the Court
and restore honor to the role of black Americans within American
history. While the debate over economic reparations for African
Americans rages on, the Court has an opportunity to institute an
anti-racist policy of its own to atone for the noneconomic damages
it inflicted through the Dred Scott opinion. Like Reagan’s apology,
by admitting a wrong, the Court can reaffirm its commitment to
equal justice under the law.
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